American Honda was founded in 1959 as a wholly owned subsidiary of the Honda Motor
[I]

Introduction: Historical Precedent, Hypothetical Intentions, and Strategic Decision-Making
The production and distribution of goods in a firm is commonly overseen by a hierarchy of management. Managers are employed by the owners of a firm but responsible for ensuring the productivity of their fellow employees rather than being charged with manipulation of goods themselves.
The hierarchy is an established order between the offices held by various managers. A given manager is superior to several of her fellow employees in that she is entitled to reports on their activities, is responsible to a degree for their success or failure, has influence over their continued tenure or promotion within the organization, and holds decision-making authority relative to choices they face on the job.
The official hierarchical structure of a firm notwithstanding, decision-making within these organizations is very often frenetic. Competing visions of a firm's future may vie politically to determine choice outcomes. Self-interested employees may favor choices not aligned with the interests of a firm's owners. Information may be available in only limited amounts or only to particular parties within the firm. Recommendations, consultations, directives but also suspicions, misunderstandings and hubris -in short, the many variants of orderly and failed collaboration -ensure the difficulty of identifying, in the real world, where strategies hail from in the hearts and minds of the people tasked with managing a company.
What is the origin of the intentions that are realized in a firm's strategy? Past research has attributed decision outcomes to intentions of different parties within the firm. Early historians and management scholars evoked a top-down process in which choices are made according to the intentions of upper management.
1 Such work followed an economic tradition in which firms are conceived as authority structures allowing managers to issue commands subsequently implemented by their subordinates. 2 Later work observed that, the authority of upper management notwithstanding, strategic decisions could be realized absent or even contrary to their intentions. These scholars argued that strategic 1 choices were made according to the express intentions of subordinates, notions passed up the hierarchy in pursuit of approval or funding.
3 This paper elaborates a qualitatively different origin for strategic intentions. We argue, by close examination of American Honda's history, that strategic choices may be guided -at root -by hypothesized intentions. Among the alternatives comprising a choice, an intention is the alternative marked for selection by the will of a particular agent. Agent A may well reveal an intention by expressing the contents of her will. But Agent B may equally hypothesize the intention of Agent A by marking an alternative for selection and invoking precedent set by Agent A to suggest the alternative is plausibly her preference. We demonstrate empirically that Kihachiro Kawashima, the President of American Honda, made important strategic decisions by following the precedent set by his boss and former mentor, Honda's chief strategist, Takeo Fujisawa. That is to say, Kawashima's own intentions in governing
American Honda originated in a hypothesis about what Fujisawa's might have been.
By describing the influence of hypothesized intentions, this paper challenges a long-standing dichotomous characterization of strategy as either deliberate or emergent. For Mintzberg, deliberate strategy consists of choices 'realized as intended' and emergent strategy consists of choices 'realized…in the absence of intention'. 4 It may seem straightforward to assume, as in these definitions, that managerial intentions are either present or absent. But in the case of Honda, Fujisawa -the ranking officer of the firm -did not know about various choices encountered in America and certainly could form no intention regarding the choice itself. Kawashima made his decision, however, by observing precedent set by Fujisawa and posing a plausible and hypothetical intention on his behalf. That is to say, the management intentions at play in the case of Honda were neither present nor absent but fictive, a creative construction of both historical reality and imagination. Mintzberg's simple distinction between deliberate and emergent does not accommodate such a case.
By identifying the guiding influence of historical precedent and hypothesized intentions, this study emphasizes the social (cf. rational or behavioral) character of strategic decision-making.
Kawashima makes decisions by channeling his former mentor rather than, say, by unaffected analysis of the business environment or uncultivated instinctual response. This is not a novel contribution and, indeed, the literature on 'Strategy as Practice' stresses that agents of the firm are embedded in social and historical context. 5 However, that literature 6 sometimes cites existing studies of early decision-making at American Honda as examples of such embeddedness -i.e. of "how agents spontaneously…draw on the particular socio-cultural norms and material resources available to respond to…practical situations ". 7 This citation is misleading because, as elaborated in Section [III] , prevailing interpretations of American
Honda stress the opportunism of its officials, not their inheritance of management techniques. The present analysis of the Honda case provides an interpretation of decision-making with explicitly social origins.
In general, a detailed historical case study provides several advantages for understanding strategic decision-making. First, case studies provide rich empirical detail that allows for an audit of decisionmaking protocols. In Section [IV] , this study identifies and rejects possible decision-making protocols in favor of 'appeal to precedent' because they lack explanatory power. Second, there are some hypotheses that cannot be verified without investigation of the historical record. Understanding the history of the
Honda Company generally (Section [V]) supported Kawashima's claims about his approach to managing
American Honda specifically (Section [VI] ). Finally, when discussing history, developments that take place after managerial choices are already available as past events. This allows us, in Section [VII] , to consider the effects of managerial choices on organizational performance over time.
The Honda Motor Company -in particular -is appropriate subject matter for a discussion of strategic decision-making. As reviewed in Section [III] , the company has provided the historical evidence for considerable debate over whether strategy in real-world organizations conforms to the intentions of upper managers or emerges according to the intuition of subordinates. 
Figure 2
Honda large bikes: price experience curves (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) Source: Boston Consulting Group, Strategy Alternatives for the British Motorcycle Industry, 41. Note: The price of Honda's larger models of motorcycles follows a trend of exponential decay when cumulative volume is interpreted as Honda's total output of motorcycles with an engine larger than 250cc. Notice -in contrast to figure 1 -that Honda begins to accumulate significant volume in large bicycles only by the late 60s and early 70s. Indeed, the CB450 was developed in 1965, but the CB350 was developed in 1968 and the CB750 first came to market in the States in 1970. Super Cub per year. 37, 38 Given that Honda was a young company, struggling to sell motorcycles, and possibly amidst a widespread recall of faulty models, the offer presented a significant sales opportunity.
39
Kobayashi, by this point the head of sales, learned of the offer and brought it to the attention of Kawashima. In a decision made without consulting Fujisawa, Kawashima turned down the offer. 40 Kawashima began to push sales of the Super Cub despite having declined the offer of Montgomery Ward. Rather than work only through the standard motorcycle outlets, he encouraged members of his sales team to reach out to non-standard outlets. Honda motorcycles could be found at sporting goods stores, hardware stores, fishing goods stores, 41 and lawn-mower repair shops. They would leave some bikes for the manager of the store to play around with for a few weeks and then talk business afterward.
42
Motorcycles were not attractive objects in the American cultural mindset of the mid-20 th century.
The machines themselves often leaked oil, and they were widely considered the implements of delinquency. Marlon Brando, for instance, rode a motorcycle in 'The Wild One', in which he played the leader of a gang responsible for disturbing the quiet of a small, California town. 43 In an effort to change the prevailing perception of motorcycles, Honda sponsored an ad-campaign with the tagline, 'You meet the nicest people on a Honda'. The advertisements themselves depicted ordinary folks -families and friends -going about day-to-day activities on Honda's models. Although the campaign proved wildly successful, the committee responsible for it was initially divided on the decision in 1963. The director of sales had to persuade the more senior president -Kawashima himself -and treasurer, both of whom favored a competing advertising proposal. There were other important advertising decisions for Kawashima to make in the early years of American Honda. He made the $80,000 decision to place a one-page ad in LIFE magazine in 11 states.
45
Grey Advertising, the agency that had sold Honda 'the nicest people' campaign, requested that they sponsor the Academy Awards when it became clear that the campaign was resonating with consumers.
46
The cost was upwards of 300,000 dollars a minute, which gave Kawashima pause. In hindsight, he recalled doubting very much whether he would have made the decision if it had been his own money, but he agreed to commit the funds and take on the mitigated, but significant, professional risk for his decision.
Kawashima also presided over American Honda when it began demanding payment from dealers before releasing motorcycles to them. American Honda may never have formally sold motorcycles on consignment, 47 but in their earliest years they would willingly advance goods before payment. In 1975, the British crown commissioned the Boston Consulting Group to explain the downfall of the British motorcycle industry. BCG reported evidence of a Japanese cost-advantage due to greater accumulated production during the 1960s but also suggested an explanation for how the organization had achieved this advantage. The consultants claimed to identify a Japanese 'marketing philosophy', or 54 The choices given the greatest degree of scrutiny in this study -whether or not to demand cash-on-delivery and which firms to use as distributors -are rightfully considered strategic choices because they pertain to the transactions in which Honda participates. 55 60 It should be noted that the authors provide no empirical historical evidence defending their claims that strategy process in Honda was guided by 'strategic intent'. They write: "When Honda took on leaders in the motorcycle industry, for example, it began with products that were just outside the conventional definition of the leaders' product-market domains. As a result, it could be a base of operations in underdefended territory and then use that base to launch an expanded attack. What many competitors failed to see was Honda's strategic intent… …[E]ven as Honda was selling 50cc motorcycles in the United States, it was already racing larger bikes in Europe -assembling the design skills and technology it would need for a systematic expansion across the entire spectrum of motor-related businesses." Of course, observing that Honda eventually expanded into other classes of motorcycle is not sufficient to conclude that management had, a priori, an intention to do so. In fact, evidence presented by Pascale suggests no such assuredness of eventual success. 61 "In truth, we had no strategy other than the idea of seeing if we could sell something in the United States. It was a new frontier, a new challenge, and it fit the 'success against all odds' culture that Mr. Honda had cultivated. I reported my impressions to Fujisawa -including the seat-of-thepants target of trying, over several years, to attain a 10 percent share of US imports. He didn't probe that target quantitatively. We did not discuss profits or deadlines for breakeven. Fujisawa told me if anyone could succeed, I could and authorized $1 million for the venture."
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It seems Fujisawa was interested in neither Kawashima's tentative goal (10 percent market share) nor any intermediary steps that might be necessary to achieve this goal. Instead, he explicitly indicates that his confidence in the project is due to his faith in the skill of his subordinate. possibility of backlash. In the case of the latter decision, then, Kawashima was at least willing to risk losing dealers and corresponding sales by refusing to advance goods.
Beyond the realized and anticipated effects of decisions, interviews provide some insight into the underlying rationale motivating the response to Montgomery Ward. 81 Kawashima describes the decision as "persisting in our refusal to sell through an intermediary". Though unspecified, Kawashima is likely referring not to any intermediary between manufacturer and customer (Honda sold through many neighborhood dealerships, after all) but specifically to the large intermediaries between manufacturer and dealership. Kobayashi corroborates this point, recalling "…we did not want to rely on a big distributor.
We wanted to be close to customers. Large distributors…would not act to meet manufacturer's needs."
82
As they recall their thought process, both focus on the position of the distributor in the supply chain. And though Kawashima and Kobayashi both mention that the offers were exclusive (suggesting sales exploitation considerations), Kawashima makes clear that "…as they would offer to sell a significant number of bikes, it did appear to be attractive in that sense". 83 The rationale provided by both Kawashima and Kobayashi for declining the offer of Montgomery Ward corroborates the notion that, in this instance, they did not act to uncritically exploit a business opportunity.
In practice, America Honda officials were authorized to make decisions on the basis of their own judgment but did not always act to exploit available sales opportunities. As a remedy to the shortcomings of hypothesized decision-making protocols, we propose another: Kawashima, who had joined Honda in 1951, made decisions by appealing to the example of his boss and former mentor, Fujisawa, whose management techniques he observed while coming up the ranks in Japan. Appeal to precedent is, after all, a possible decision-making protocol; if available alternatives closely approximate those of a choice made previously by another agent, then that agent's selection can serve as a guide for one's own. 81 No such self-reflection or assessment of rationale regarding the demand for cash-on-delivery is available in interviews with these actors. [A] Precedent established by Fujisawa
When Honda was still in the business of manufacturing engines to supply as components, much of its business came from Kioritz Agricultural Machinery, who used the engines to make generators.
Kioritz was a large company -it was listed in the first section of the stock exchange -and it was generally well regarded. Though business with Kioritz was profitable for Honda, Fujisawa decided to terminate the relationship. According to Kawashima, "His basic idea was that Honda had to follow Kioritz's production plan. If they changed their production plan, then Honda would have to give in to their plan and change our production plan. As in the case of the sales network, we did not want others to have the initiative. His idea was that we should stop doing business if Honda cannot take the initiative. That must have been a big decision to make."
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Fujisawa's primary concern is that Kioritz has a greater degree of flexibility than other distributors in adjusting the number of engines it orders from Honda. Kioritz's interests in rival accounts certainly makes them less dependent on successful resale of these engines.
Fujisawa was similarly wary of the traditional motorcycle dealers in the Japanese market. There were only about 300-400 85 such dealers in the early 1950s and were in high demand from the many motorcycle manufacturers of the day. Honda had sold its "D-type" and "A-type" motorcycles through these outlets, but Fujisawa felt that Honda's designs had been treated dismissively, put wherever there happened to be room on the sales floor. 86 In March 1952, Soichiro Honda completed the prototype of the 50cc "Cub Type F". This was the first realization of an appealing combination of power and size, which, when realized with significant technological advances in the Super Cub, would launch Honda onto the world state. Because the engine was powerful but small enough to be clipped to a bicycle frame,
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Fujisawa realized he could bypass traditional dealers and appeal to Japan's smaller but more numerous bicycle shops instead.
88,89
As the Cub became a popular motorcycle, Fujisawa demanded that bicycle shop owners pay him in advance. Though some contend cash-on-delivery was the outcome of working through bicycle shops, a dealer working for Honda at the time made clear that advance payments were not required until 6-12 months after the Cub went on sale (and after orders for the Cub increased). He continues:
"Dealers in various parts of the country were now to be required to give advance payments to secure products for their dealerships, and so I had to pay them myself. This news hit me like a bolt from the blue, and I wasn't pleased. This was my incentive to begin producing my own motorcycle." 90 Thus, not only was the decision to demand advance payment distinct from the decision to appeal to bicycle shop owners, but the latter also appears to have upset Honda's dealer network and hurt short-term sales. 85 Sakiya, Honda Motor, 84. 89 Because Fujisawa stopped selling through the traditional, large motorcycle distributors, this decision serves as precedent for Kawashima's later refusal of the Montgomery Ward offer. In the same historical moment, however, Fujisawa opted in favor of reaching out to non-traditional retail spaces. Although not the analytical focus of this section, the latter decision could well have served as precedent for Kawashima when reaching out to sporting goods and fishing stores. For that matter, there is evidence to suggest that Fujisawa's management style guided Kawashima when he made decisions to advertise through Time and the Academy Awards. Though historical precedent could have served as a decision-making guide in these case, the fact that behavior exploits sales opportunities means that we cannot rule out autonomous opportunism as a decision-making protocol. 90 Alexander, Japan's Motorcycle Wars, 186-87.
Even after the introduction of the Cub, Fujisawa continued to push Honda to demand cash-ondelivery. He used Honda's growing sales force to be closer in its scrutiny of clients and more persistent in its demand for advance payment. 91 He also demanded cash-on-delivery for the Benly, a high-performance motorcycle that went on sale in August 1953, and the Juno, a scooter that went on sale in January 1954.
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This demand, however, continued to give dealers pause; after the Juno proved to be a failed product, Fujisawa opted not to demand cash-on-delivery when selling the Super Cub in Japan. [B]
Motivations for the precedent established by Fujisawa Fujisawa's preferences for smaller distributors and advance payment clearly did not stem from a desire to maximize sales in the short run. Instead, there is evidence that they stemmed from a desire for reliable sales and payment, which were hard to come by in Japan's chaotic young motorcycle industry of the late 1940s and early 1950s. Securing a reliable source of components (transmissions, engines, frames, seats, wheels and wire harnesses) could be a challenge for firms, 94 but it could be equally challenging to secure reliable distribution channels. Suzuki Koji, president of Meguro Manufacturing of Tokyo, described how manufacturers sold their output:
"Dealers came to stay in local inns near the factory, scrambling for the products. 'No trial runs yet,' or 'The trial run was good …' they shouted, and took the products home….At one time, 91 The process of selling completed motorcycles for distribution was disorganized and relied heavily on dealers chasing hot models.
In a marketplace of such fleeting relationships, manufacturers struggled to get paid for their goods, even when dealers agreed to market them. In Honda's early years, it was common for manufacturers to sell to dealers on a consignment basis. 96 When manufacturers demanded cash deposits, they were often in small amounts. Dealers were known to pay with checks that bounced. And when bank drafts became available, dealers went so far as to forge counterfeit drafts in the amount of the required deposit, leaving the manufacturer empty handed. This could cost manufacturers millions of yen and contributed to the demise of some manufacturers like Monarch motors.
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After Fujisawa joined the Honda Motor Company in October 1949, 98 he encountered precisely the difficulty of obtaining payment from dealers. At the time, Honda produced one engine that was 98cc
and another that was 50cc. The latter could be fit onto a bicycle frame by Honda, but the former required a sturdier frame than the company was able to produce. Rather than assemble a bike in-house, Honda sold the engine to a distributor who bought a suitable frame from a rival company, Kitagawa. The distributor assembled the motorcycle and then sold it downstream. 99 Though Honda delivered 100 engines per month to the distributor, Kitagawa had scaled back production and begun delivering only 50-80 of the corresponding frames. Kitagawa received payments un-problematically but Fujisawa had a difficult time getting the distributor to pay for all the engines Honda had provided.
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Some important determinants of sales and payment reliability are revealed by the Kitagawa example that seem to inform Fujisawa's later decision-making. First, the distributor's interest in a rival account appears to have led them to change their production schedule. This is precisely the phenomenon The similarities between Kawashima's judgment and that of his boss were no coincidence.
Kawashima had significant exposure to Fujisawa's decision-making process and described what it was like working for him in the early years:
"He would carefully think about the possible challenges for two or three days before presenting the plan to us. Then he would see how we respond to his proposal, and if he thinks that we are not so responsive, then he would take it back and rethink the strategy…. The distribution channels as designed by Kawashima played a role in alerting Fujisawa to changing consumer tastes. When dealers can break contractual or verbal agreements without repercussion and are advanced goods before payment, they may err on the side of ordering units in excess of expected demand, knowing they need not repay debts in their entirety if strapped for cash. Under such an arrangement, inventory overseen by the manufacturer would propagate less quickly in response to falling demand. In the case of Honda motor, a delayed inventory crisis might have delayed managers at American Honda in contacting Fujisawa. Conversely, to the extent that large dealers with rival accounts (like department stores) face less cost than independent dealers in changing production schedules, they may be more likely to do so for reasons other than changes in consumer demand. Accumulating inventory is therefore a more robust indicator of changing consumer tastes rather than disloyal distributors in the latter case. The decision to avoid large distributors and to demand cash-on-delivery, then, may well have improved information about demand available from observation of manufacturer inventory levels.
Once alerted, Fujisawa suggested improvements to the response plan proposed by ranking officials at American Honda. They intended to heavily discount prices to facilitate sales and reduce the expenses they bore to maintain inventory. But big discounts would sacrifice considerable revenue and would risk violating anti-dumping laws in the United States, so Fujisawa convinced officials to hold off.
By extending Honda's credit line with the Mitsubishi bank and by slowing factory output in Japan, he gave them more time to sell off the inventory. With more time, discounts could be mitigated to improve the revenue taken on the existing models and, when the models became out dated at years end, discounts were legally less risky.
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Fujisawa noticed something else that American Honda's management had not -the plan to discount prices would solve the inventory crisis, but that the inventory problem was just a symptom. As he explained before leaving:
"This drop in sales owes to my inability to supply you with new models which were neglected because of Tokyo's self-conceit. Price cutting won't work because the real problem is unattractive current models. Don't worry about the inventory -somehow I'll manage to finance it on my return to Tokyo -but keep on trying to sell until we can get new models to you."
130
Fujisawa explicitly observed a demand problem that would not be resolved by addressing growing inventory. As promised, upon returning to Tokyo, Fujisawa put pressure on engineers in Honda's R&D department to develop new models.
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Though Fujisawa was undoubtedly right about the problem of underlying demand, there was speculation that consumer durables were all suffering as a result of macroeconomic fluctuation and the 129 "Tired of people not noticing? In past years, motorcycling marked you as a man apart. But now everyone rides a motorcycle, and things don't seem the same any more. The only thing that could relight your fire is the very best road bike in the world. Owning a bike like this, you could thumb your nose at the Honda Motor Company, which is most responsible for seeing that hordes of nouveau riders crowd you on your private road. But if you had the finest of all production machines, this two-wheeled answer to Ferrari-Porsche-Lamborghini, you would be riding a Honda 750cc four-cylinder. Soichiro-San would have the last laugh."
[VIII] Conclusion
This history describes the management of American Honda by investigating the origin and consequences of distribution decisions. We focus on Kawashima's decision to decline Montgomery Ward and demand cash-on-delivery. By revisiting Honda's earlier history in Japan, we argue we argue that Kawashima's operative decision-making protocol was an appeal to historical precedent. By considering Honda's sales crisis in the late 1960s, we argue that the decision-outcomes realized through this protocol helped facilitate the segment advance that secured American Honda's leadership in the United States.
Jointly, these arguments supplement a historical literature on the managerial determinants of American Honda's success, one that has wrestled with whether American Honda's early strategy is best characterized as deliberate or emergent. Reconciling opposing points of view, we argue that -as it pertains to certain decisions -Kawashima felt directed by Fujisawa's intentions despite the fact that Fujisawa never expressed any.
In a broader sense, this paper extends the literature that seeks to divulge the origin of intentions realized in strategy. Previous literature has suggested that intentions may originate in the will of individuals at various rungs of the organizational hierarchy. This paper suggests that the intentions governing strategy may instead originate in the imagination of an employee, as she hypothesizes the intention of a manager or mentor. As described in the introduction, this poses a problem for the characterization of strategy as either deliberate or emergent. The intentions that govern strategic choices may be hypothetical but made credible by comparison to historical precedent, that is, something in between the categories proposed by Mintzberg.
Describing the empirically observable decision-making processes within the firm is a legitimate scientific pursuit. Doing so productively, however, requires adequate conceptual tools and categorization schemes. If there are shortcomings to a typology that describes strategic decisions as merely intended or unintended, an alternative classification scheme may provide clarity. In this history, it was helpful to instead identify the party authorized to make a decision and the decision-rule employed. In cases of deliberate strategy, decision-making authority will rest with upper management. 
